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Abstract: MELIBEA is a directory of institutional open-access policies for 
research output that uses a composite formula with eight weighted conditions to 
estimate the “strength” of Open Access mandates (registered in ROARMAP). We 
analyzed total Web of Science-(WoS)-indexed publication output in years 2011-
2013 for 67 institutions where OA was mandated in order to estimate the 
mandates’ effectiveness: How well did the MELIBEA score and its individual 
conditions predict what percentage of the WoS-indexed articles is actually 
deposited in each institution’s OA repository, and when. We found a small but 
significant positive correlation (0.18) between the MELIBEA “strength” score and 
deposit percentage. For three of the eight MELIBEA conditions (deposit timing, 
internal use, and opt-outs), one value of each was strongly associated with 
deposit percentage or latency (1: immediate deposit required; 2: deposit required 
for performance evaluation; 3: unconditional opt-out allowed for the OA 
requirement but no opt-out for deposit requirement). When we updated the initial 
values and weights of the MELIBEA formula to reflect the empirical association 
we had found, the score’s predictive power for mandate effectiveness doubled 
(.36). There are not yet enough OA mandates to test further mandate conditions 
that might contribute to mandate effectiveness, but the present findings already 
suggest that it would be productive for existing and future mandates to adopt the 
three identified conditions so as to maximize their effectiveness, and thereby the 
growth of OA. 
 
Introduction  
The Open Access (OA) movement (BOAI 2002) arose as a result of two concurrent 
developments: (1) the “serials crisis,” which made research journals increasingly 
unaffordable, hence inaccessible, to researchers’ institutions (Okerson & O’Donnell 
1995; Miller et al 2010), even the richest ones (Harvard University Library 2012) and (2) 
the advent of the online medium, which made it possible in principle to make all 
research journal articles freely accessible to all users online.  
The primary target content of the OA movement is refereed research journal articles. 
That is the only kind of item analyzed in this study. Researchers can provide OA to their 
journal articles in two different ways – by publishing in an OA journal (“Gold OA,” often 
for a publication fee) or by publishing in a subscription journal and, in addition, self-
archiving the final, peer-reviewed draft online (“Green OA”) (Harnad et al 2004). The 
present analysis of institutional OA policies is based exclusively on articles published in 
non-OA journals. Those subscription journal articles are the primary targets of 
institutional OA self-archiving mandates (because mandate effectiveness is dependent 
on author compliance and constrained by subscription publisher OA embargoes), 
whereas articles in OA journals are OA already (whether or not they are self-archived). 
Our dependent variable in this study is the percentage of each mandating institution’s 
articles published in non-OA journals that are deposited in the author’s institutional 
repository (as well as the deposit’s timing and OA status). 
OA also comes in two degrees: “Gratis” OA is free online access. “Libre” OA is free  
online access plus certain re-use rights (Suber 2008a). We will only be considering  
Gratis OA in this study, because (1) Gratis OA is a prerequisite for Libre OA, (2) it faces  
fewer publisher restrictions (e.g., OA embargoes), and (3) it is the most urgently needed  
by researchers. We will also only be considering Green OA (self-archiving), 
because (a) the majority of OA to date is Green, (b) it does not entail any payment of  
OA publishing fees, (c) it can be provided by researchers themselves, and, as will be 
 explained below, (d) providing Green OA can be mandated by researchers’ institutions  
and funders (without having to pay any extra publisher Gold OA fees).  
 
One might have expected that because of the many advantages provided by OA 
(Hitchcock 2013) – viz, free access for all users, enhanced research uptake and impact, 
relief from the serials crisis, and the speed and power of the online medium – 
researchers would all have hastened to make their papers (Green) OA ever since it 
became possible. But the growth of OA – which has been possible since even before 
the birth of the Web in 1989 (Berners-Lee 1989) -- has actually been surprisingly slow: 
For example, in 2009, already two decades after the Web began, Björk et al estimated 
the percentage of OA to be only 20.4% (the majority of it Green). In 2013 Archambault 
announced close to 50% OA, but Chen (2014) found only 37.8% and Khabsa & Giles 
(2014) even less (24%). All these studies reported great variation across fields and 
none took timing adequately into account (publication date vs. OA date): Björk et al 
(2014) pointed out that 62% of journals (from the top 100 journal publishers indexed by 
SCOPUS) endorse immediate Green OA self-archiving by their authors, 4% impose a 6-
month embargo, and 13% impose a 12-month embargo; so at least 79% of articles 
published in any recent year could already have been OA within 12 months of their date 
of publication via Green OA alone, 62% of them immediately, if authors were actually 
providing it. 
There are many reasons why researchers have been so slow to provide Green OA even 
though they themselves would be its biggest potential beneficiaries (Spezi et al 2013; 
Taylor & Francis 2015; Wallace 2011). The three principal reasons are that (i) 
researchers are unsure whether they have the legal right to self-archive, (ii) they fear 
that it might put their paper’s acceptance for publication at risk and (iii) they believe that 
self-archiving may be a lot of work (Harnad 2006). All these concerns are demonstrably 
groundless (Pinfield 2001; Swan & Brown 2005; Carr et al 2005, 2007; ETH Zurich FAQ 
2015; SHERPA/Romeo 2015) but it has become increasingly clear with time that merely 
pointing out how and why they are groundless is still not enough to induce authors to go 
ahead and self-archive of their own accord. Researchers’ funders and institutions 
worldwide are now beginning to realize that they need to extend their existing “publish 
or perish” mandates so as to make it mandatory to provide OA to researchers’ 
publications, not only for the benefit of (i) the researchers themselves and of (ii) 
research progress, but also to maximize the (iii) return to the tax-paying public on its 
investment in funding the research.  
Funders and institutions are accordingly beginning to adopt OA policies: Starting with 
NIH in the US and the Wellcome Trust in the UK -- soon followed by the Research 
Funding Councils UK, the European Commission, and most recently President Obama’s 
Directive to all the major US federal funding agencies -- research funders the world over 
are beginning to mandate OA (ROARMAP 2015). In addition, research institutions, the 
providers of the research, are doing likewise, with Harvard, MIT, University College 
London and ETH Zurich among the vanguard, adopting OA mandates of their own that 
require all their journal article output, across all disciplines, funded and unfunded, to be 
deposited in their institutional OA repositories.  
These first OA mandates, however, differ widely, both in their specific requirements and 
in their resultant success in generating OA. Some mandates generate deposit rates of 
over 80%, whereas others are doing no better than the global baseline for spontaneous 
(un-mandated) self-archiving (Gargouri et al 2013). As mandate adoption grows 
worldwide, it is therefore important to analyze the existing mandates to determine which 
mandate conditions are important to making a mandate effective (Swan et al 2015). 
We have accordingly analyzed the institutional policies indexed by MELIBEA, a 
directory of institutional open-access policies for research output that classifies OA 
mandates in terms of their specific conditions as well as providing a score for overall 
mandate strength. This score is based on a composite formula initialized with a-priori 
values and weights for eight conditions that MELIBEA interprets as reflecting policy 
strength (see Figure 3 and Table 1). The purpose of the present study was (i) to test the 
predictive power of the overall MELIBEA score for mandate effectiveness, as reflected 
in deposit rate and deposit timing, (ii) to test individually the association of each of the 
conditions with deposit rate and timing, and (iii) to transform the initial values and 
weights of the MELIBEA formula to reflect the empirical findings of (ii).  
What we found was a small but significant positive correlation between (i) the original 
MELIBEA score for policy strength and (ii) deposit rate. We also found that for three of 
the eight MELIBEA conditions (1: deposit timing, 2: internal use, and 3: opt-outs), one of 
the value options for each condition was most strongly correlated with deposit rate and 
latency (1: immediate deposit required, 2: deposit required for performance evaluation, 
3: unconditional opt-out allowed for the OA requirement but no opt-out for deposit 
requirement). When we updated the initial values and weights of the original MELIBEA 
formula to reflect this correlation, the new score’s predictive power for deposit rate was 
doubled. This suggests that it would be useful to adopt OA mandates with these 
conditions in order to maximize their effectiveness, and thereby maximize the growth of 
OA. 
Databases Used  
The data for our analysis were drawn from several databases. The ROAR Registry of 
OA Repositories provided a database of all open access repositories (ROAR, 
http://roar.eprints.org). The ROARMAP Registry of OA Repository Mandates and 
Archiving Policies provided the subset of the ROAR repositories that had an OA 
mandate (ROARMAP, http://roarmap.eprints.org). An in-house version of the Thomson 
Reuters Web of Science (WoS) database hosted at the Observatoire des sciences et 
des technologies (OST-UQAM) provided the bibliographic metadata for all (WoS-
indexed) articles published in years 2011-2013 by any author affiliated with the 
ROARMAP subset of institutions with OA mandates that had been adopted by 2011. 
The MELIBEA Directory and Estimator of OA Policies provided a classification of the 
OA mandates in terms of their specific conditions (assigning a numerical value to each 
option for each condition) plus an overall score based on a weighted combination of 
eight of those conditions as an estimate of policy strength (MELIBEA 
(http://accesoabierto.net/politicas) (Table 1). 
WoS indexes the 12,000 most cited peer-reviewed academic journals in each research 
area. (This corresponds to slightly more than 11% of the 105,000 peer-reviewed 
journals listed in Ulrich’s Global Serials Directory, http://ulrichsweb.com.)  The 
bibliographic records (authors, title, journal, volume, issue, date) for all the WoS-
indexed articles for each of the three years (2011-2013) for each of the target 
institutions were retrieved from the WoS database. The bibliographic records (authors, 
title, journal, volume, issue, date) for all the deposited full-texts for each of the three 
years (2011-2013) for each of the target institutions were retrieved from the repository 
database. The percentage deposit was determined by the percentage of WoS records 
that matched the repository records. (Note that this is not the percentage of all 
institutional output, only of WoS-indexed output; nor is it the percentage of all WoS-
indexed output that is OA somewhere on the web, but only the percentage that is 
deposited in the institutional repository, in compliance with the institution’s OA policy.) 
We also used the Webometrics Ranking Web of Universities, which estimates 
institutions’ “excellence” based on how many of their published articles are among the 
most cited 10% of articles (the lower the score the higher the rank). 
(http://webometrics.info). A disjoint set 19 institutions at the very bottom of the 
distribution (i.e., those with Webometrics ranks beyond 5000th; see Figure 1) was 
excluded from our sample as outliers. To balance representativeness and sample size 
and minimize sampling bias, we further excluded any institution that had fewer than 30 
publications for any of the three years in our study. The number of institutions resulting 
after applying each of these selection criteria is shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1:  Total number of institutional policies indexed by ROARMAP (R), 
MELIBEA (M) and their shared intersection (R∩M), followed by the minimal 
sample size and the total number of institutions left after applying our selection 
criteria. Policy onset dates were based on ROARMAP.  
 
  
Figure 1: Distribution of mandated institutions by their Webometrics ranks 
for “excellence” (citedness), (Note: Higher score means lower rank. The 19 
bottom-ranked outliers were excluded from study.) 
Deposit Rate and Deposit Latency 
Each of the 67 institutional repositories was crawled to determine what percentage of its 
WoS-indexed articles had been deposited (deposit rate), and when they were deposited 
RoarMap (R) Melibea (M) R∩M Sample size(R∩M) Total
2011 141 - 120 51 47
2012 162 - 140 62 57
2013 194 - 164 71 65
2011-3 194 426 164 77 67
(deposit latency, i.e., the delay between (1) the publication date according to the WoS 
Access date and (2) the repository deposit date) for publication years 2011, 2012 and 
2013 (crawled in April 2014). Deposits could be of two kinds: Open Access (OA) or 
Restricted Access (RA), to comply with publisher OA embargoes. We subtracted the 
publication date from the deposit date, so negative values mean an article was 
deposited before publication and positive values mean it was deposited after publication 
(Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of institutions’ average deposit rates (percentage of 
WoS articles deposited) and deposit latencies (in days, relative to 
publication date) for Open Access (OA) and Restricted Access (RA) 
deposits. The peak for RA deposit latency is negative (i.e., before 
publication) and the peak for OA deposit latency is positive (i.e., after 
publication). 
MELIBEA Score for Mandate Strength 
We used each mandating institution’s overall MELIBEA score for policy strength as of 
April 6 2014. This score is a combination of eight specific individual conditions (re-
numbered here, with each condition weighted by a percentage weight, summing to 
100%) plus the respective options for each condition (each option weighted by a 
numerical value) (Figure 3 and Table 2) for each OA policy for each mandating 
institution. We tested how well the MELIBEA strength formula consisting of these 8 
weighted conditions and their weighted option values jointly predicted deposit rate and 
deposit latency (i.e., policy effectiveness). Then we analyzed each individual condition 
and its options separately with Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) to determine how much 
each individual option contributed to predicting deposit rate or latency. 
 
40%(𝐶1) + 10%(𝐶2) + 5%(𝐶3) + 10%(𝐶4) 5% (𝐶5) +  10%(𝐶6) +  10%(𝐶7) +  10%(𝐶8) 
Figure 3: The eight mandate conditions (renamed C1-C8 here) and their 
initial percentage weights in MELIBEA’s formula for policy strength. (See 
Table 2 below for a description of each condition and its respective options 
and value weights.) 
 
   
Table 2: The eight MELIBEA conditions (re-numbered) together with the 
initial values assigned by MELIBEA for each option for each condition in 
Value -2 12 months after publication
1 Request 0.5 6 months after publication
2 Requirement -2 More  than 12 months after publication
-2 Unspecified (‘after period stipulated by the publisher’)
1 No
2 
2 No deposit opt-out but unconditional OA opt-out 2 Require blanket copyright reservation, no opt-out
2 No deposit opt-out but conditional OA opt-out 1 Allow opt-out from copyright reservation case by case
-1 Deposit opt-out and unconditional OA opt-out
2 
2 Retain copyright and license specific rights to publisher
2
Authors retain the non-exclusive rights of explotation to allow 
self-archiving
0.8 Deposit author’s version 1 Authors should retain copyright whenever is possible
0.8 Deposit publisher’s version 1
Any publishing or copyright agreements concerning articles have  
to comply with the OA policy
0 Unspecified -2 No copyright reservation
0.4 Unrefereed preprint
2 Yes
0.5 As soon as possible
2 0 No
2 At time of acceptance
1.5 At time of publication 2 Yes
0 Unspecified 0 No
1
Only mandatory (required) policies considered in this analysis, not recommended policies
2
Not enough instances
3
Inconsistent options
4
Only journal article conditions relevant
C7 :  Internal use (10%)
C1: Mandate or Request (40%)
1
C2 : Opt-out (10%)
C3 : Version (5%)
2
C4 : Deposit Timing  (10%)
C5 : Embargo Length(10%)
2
C6 : Copyright (10%)
2,3
C8 : Theses (10%)
4
the formula for the mandate strength score, Figure 3). Separate ANOVAS 
were done (see below) for the three boldface conditions and options (2, 4, 
7). The other conditions either did not have enough mandate instances (3, 
5, 6) or were irrelevant to this study (1, 8). 
We excluded from this study all OA policies that were not mandates (i.e., compliance 
was not required, only recommended) because it is already known that mandating (i.e., 
requiring) OA is more effective than just requesting, recommending or encouraging it 
(Suber 2008b, Xia et al 2012). Our specific interest here is in which of the conditions of 
mandatory OA policies make a contribution to increasing deposit rate and/or decreasing 
deposit latency. For the individual t-tests and ANOVAs testing the eight MELIBEA 
conditions and their respective options separately, three of the conditions (Version (C3), 
Embargo Length (C5), Copyright (C6)) did not have enough institutional mandate 
instances to be tested with an ANOVA; one condition (Theses (C8)) was irrelevant to 
our target content, which was only refereed journal articles; and, as noted, for C1 
(Required or Recommended), our study concerned only the mandatory (required) 
policies, not recommended ones. We accordingly analyzed only conditions C2 (Opt-
Out), C4 (Deposit Timing) and C7 (Internal Use) with their respective options:  
Condition C2 (Opt-Out): Deposit and OA are both required and (2a) opt-out is not 
allowed from the deposit requirement but conditional opt-out is allowed from the OA 
requirement, on a case-by-case basis; (2b) opt-out is not allowed from the deposit 
requirement but unconditional opt-out is allowed from the OA requirement; (2c) 
unconditional opt-out is allowed from both the deposit and the OA requirements. 
Condition C4 (Deposit Timing): Deposit is required (4a) at time of acceptance, (4b) 
at time of publication, or (4c) time unspecified.  
Condition C7 (Internal Use): Deposit is (7a) required for internal use (usually 
research evaluation) or (7b) not required for internal use. 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of MELIBEA scores for OA mandate strength 
  
 Power of Initialized MELIBEA Score to Predict Deposit Rate and Latency  
To test the correlation between the MELIBEA score for mandate strength and deposit 
(1) rate and (2) latency, we analyzed OA and RA deposits separately as well as jointly 
(OA + RA). For deposit latency, which was normally distributed (its skewness fell within 
two Standard Errors of Skewness [SES]), we used the Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficient. For deposit rate, which was not normally distributed (Figure 2), 
we used permutation tests1 (Edgington & Onghena, 2007). The individual mandate 
conditions were then tested using a combination of t-tests and one-way ANOVAs, with 
and without permutation testing.  
The overall MELIBEA score is a weighted combination of the eight specific conditions of 
OA policies (Table 2), assigning a value to each of their options, and then combining 
them into the weighted formula in Figure 1 (40%(C1) + 10%(C2) + 5%(C3) + 10%(C4) + 
5% (C5) + 10%(C6) + 10%(C7) + 10% (C8)). 
MELIBEA initialized the overall score with these weightings on the 8 conditions as well 
as with their respective option values (on the basis of theory and what prior evidence 
was available). Each of these initialized values and weightings is now awaiting 
evidence-based validation of their power to predict the effectiveness of OA mandates 
(i.e., how many OA and RA deposits they generate, and how soon) so that either the 
values or the weightings can be updated to maximize their predictive power as the 
evidence base grows. At the end of this section we will illustrate how these initial values 
and weightings can be updated based on the present findings so as to make the 
MELIBEA score more predictive of deposit rate and latency. 
Our analysis found that this initial overall MELIBEA score has a small significant positive 
correlation with deposit rate for OA deposits (Figure 5) but not for RA deposits (nor for 
OA + RA jointly). For deposit latency there is no correlation at all with the overall 
MELIBEA score.  
  
                                                          
1 Permutation tests consist of random permutations of the values in a sample iterated a 
large number of times (e.g. 10,000) and computing the test statistic for each new 
sample. The p value is the probability that the test statistic of the original sample will 
occur within the distribution generated. Permutation testing does not presuppose 
homogeneity of variance or normality.  
 
  
Figure 5: Correlation between MELIBEA mandate strength score and 
deposit rate, by publication year, for RA deposits, OA deposits and RA + 
OA deposits jointly 
 
Effect of Deposit-Timing Condition (C4) on Deposit Rate and Latency 
To update and optimize the weightings on the specific OA policy conditions, we need to 
look at their predictive power individually. As noted, two of the eight conditions are not 
relevant for this study, and for three of the conditions the number of OA policies that 
have adopted them is so far still too small to test their effectiveness. We report here the 
results for only those three conditions (Opt-Out (C2), Deposit Timing (C4) and Internal 
Use (C7)) that have reached testable sample sizes. 
For OA and RA deposits combined, mandates that required deposit “At time of 
acceptance” had a significantly higher deposit rate than mandates that required deposit 
“At time of publication” or “Unspecified.” The same pattern is present for each of the 
three years, significant for year 2011 and almost significant for all three years combined 
(Figure 6). The effect for RA deposits alone and OA deposits likewise shows exactly the 
same pattern, for each of the three years, but without reaching statistical significance. 
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Figure 6: Average deposit rate when deposit is required at time of 
acceptance, at time of publication, or unspecified (Condition C4). For each 
of the three years, requiring deposit at time of acceptance consistently 
generates a higher deposit rate for RA + OA considered jointly (upper 
histogram) as well as for OA (left) and RA (right) considered separately 
(lower histogram). 
When the deposit must be done is an especially important parameter in determining 
mandate effectiveness. Our interpretation is that requiring deposit at time of acceptance 
gives authors a much clearer and more specific time-marker than requiring deposit at 
time of publication. After submission, refereeing, revision and resubmission, successful 
authors receive a dated letter from the journal notifying them that their final draft has 
now been accepted for publication. That is the natural point in authors’ workflow to 
deposit their final draft (Swan 2014): Authors know the acceptance date then, and have 
the final draft in hand. Publication date, in contrast, is uncertain: (1) authors don’t know 
when the published version will appear: the delay (“publication lag”) following 
acceptance can be quite long (sometimes months or even years); (2) the calendar date 
on the published issue may not correspond to the actual date it appeared; and (3) by 
the time the article is published the author may no longer have the final draft available 
for deposit. Requiring deposit at an unspecified date is even more vague, and probably 
closer to not requiring deposit at all.  
 
 
Figure 7: Average deposit latencies (delays relative to publication date = 
0). There is no interpretable effect of deposit timing requirements 
(Condition C4) on average deposit latencies, either for RA + OA (shown), 
or for RA and OA separately. 
One would expect the deposit timing requirement (Condition C4) to have an effect not 
only on deposit rate but also on deposit latency, i.e., the time at which the deposit is 
done; yet no interpretable pattern or statistical significance was observed across the 
three years for RA, OA or RA + OA (Figure 7). This may be because RA deposits are 
eventually converted to OA (as the OA embargo elapses). So the effect of deposit 
timing on deposit latency may be indirect, generating more (rather than earlier) RA 
deposits (which in any case occur earlier than OA deposits, and later become OA). 
Latency effects are harder to detect because our sample sizes for these measures are 
much smaller. The latency pattern is likely to become clearer as the database grows. 
We can already detect a significant effect of the internal-use condition (C7) on deposit 
latency (see below).  
Which version must be deposited (the author’s final draft or the publisher’s version of 
record -- MELIBEA Condition C3) might also be expected to have an effect on deposit 
rate and/or latency, but it was not possible to make the comparison, because of our 
exclusion criteria: Before excluding the institutions that had fewer than 30 publications 
or Webometric rank beyond 5000, mandates requiring deposit of the author’s version 
did have a significantly higher deposit rate than those requiring deposit of the 
publisher’s version. But once the weaker institutions were excluded, almost all the 
remaining policies required the publisher’s version, so no comparison was possible. 
This pattern, however, is consistent with the interpretation that requiring deposit 
immediately upon acceptance generates more deposits, and hence more deposits of 
the author’s final draft. As there are more publisher restrictions on the later publisher’s 
version than on the earlier author’s version, and as many authors are reluctant to put 
their chances of getting published at (perceived) risk by challenging their publishers’ 
restrictions, it is to be expected that the compliance rate for the author’s version will be 
higher, and also that deposit will be done sooner, with papers initially deposited as RA 
and then made OA after the publisher OA embargo has elapsed. 
Effect of Internal-Use Condition (C7) on Deposit Rate and Latency 
When it is stipulated that deposit is required “For internal use” (Condition C7), deposit 
rates are significantly higher for OA and RA deposits combined (Figure 8). The effect is 
larger and significant for RA deposits alone and smaller but in the same direction for OA 
deposits alone. With an internal-use requirement (usually for research performance 
evaluation), deposit latency is also significantly shorter for OA and RA combined, but 
this time the effect is larger and significant for OA deposits alone, smaller and not 
significant for RA deposits alone (Figure 9). (Note that especially for 2013 this 
measurement in April 2014 was probably too early for a reliable estimate because the 
average delay of about 175 days for mandates without an internal-use requirement had 
not yet been reached in April 2014. Similarly, the deposit rate for 2011 may be inflated 
because papers published in that year had the longest time to get deposited by April 
2014.) 
 Figure 8: Average deposit rates, with and without internal use. For each of 
the three years, average OA + RA deposit rates are higher when the 
deposit is required for internal institutional use (e.g., research evaluation; 
Condition C7). The pattern is the same for OA alone (left) and RA alone 
(right), for each of the three years, but the deposit rate difference is bigger 
for RA. 
 
 
 Figure 9: For each of the three years the average OA + RA deposit 
latencies are shorter when there is a requirement to deposit for internal 
use (Condition C7). (Higher is later, lower is earlier; 0 is the date of 
publication; latency is in days, relative to publication date). The pattern is 
the same for OA alone (left) and RA alone (right) for each of the three 
years, but the effect is bigger for OA.  
The internal-use requirement pertains mostly to research performance evaluation, on 
which a researcher’s rank and salary often depend. Hence it is predictable that 
researchers will be eager to make their papers available for this purpose by depositing 
them (Rentier & Thirion 2011). And since internal use only requires deposit, not OA, it is 
also predictable that this requirement will have a stronger effect on RA deposit than on 
OA deposit. What is a little surprising is that an internal-use requirement accelerates OA 
deposits more than RA deposits. This may be because our latency data were noisier 
and had more gaps (missing data) than our deposit data. It could also be because RA 
deposits occur earlier than OA deposits in any case (because of publisher OA 
embargoes), leaving less room for shortening their latency even further. Or it may be 
because the internal-use requirement (C7) has the effect of reinforcing the deposit-
upon-acceptance requirement (C4) for OA deposits (those that have no publisher OA 
embargo with which the author wishes to comply): “You have to deposit immediately on 
acceptance anyway, for performance evaluation, so you may as well make it OA 
immediately too, rather than just RA.” 
 Effect of Opt-Out Condition (C2) on Deposit Rate and Latency 
The last policy condition that proved significant concerned the right to waive or opt out 
of a requirement (Condition C2): We looked at the subset of mandates where the author 
was required both to deposit and to make the deposit OA, but was allowed to opt out of 
the OA requirement (only) (i.e., the deposit could be RA instead of OA). In particular, 
the effect concerned whether (i) unconditional opt-out from the OA requirement was 
allowed or (ii) the author had to negotiate each opt-out individually, on a conditional, 
case-by-case basis.  
We found that an OA requirement allowing unconditional opt-out generates a higher 
deposit rate than an OA requirement allowing only a conditional opt-out (Figure 10). 
This result might seem paradoxical at first, because in a sense a “requirement” that 
allows an unconditional opt-out is not a requirement at all! So why would it generate a 
higher deposit rate than a requirement allowing only a conditional opt-out? We think the 
answer is in the component of the requirement from which no opt-out at all is allowed, 
namely, the deposit requirement itself: The internal-use requirement (C7) reinforces 
compliance with the immediate-deposit requirement (C4). In contrast, having to 
negotiate opt-out from the OA requirement case-by-case (conditional OA opt-out) 
inhibits compliance with the immediate-deposit requirement, whereas the possibility of 
unconditional opt-out from the OA requirement (C2) reinforces compliance with the 
immediate-deposit requirement.  
(Suppose an author was reluctant about complying with an OA mandate. The mandate 
requires both (1) depositing and (2) making the deposit OA. If the author’s reluctance 
was about having to make the deposit OA (i.e., 2) – because of legal worries, for 
example -- the author may not deposit at all (i.e., 1) if opting out of OA (2) could only be 
done through negotiations whose outcome was uncertain. But if authors whose 
ambivalence was because of (2) knew in advance that they could opt out of (2) 
unconditionally, without the need to negotiate, then they would no longer have any 
reason not to comply with (1), by depositing and leaving the deposit as RA instead of 
OA and relying instead on the repository’s copy-request Button to provide access during 
the publisher embargo.) 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10: When deposit is required (no opt out) but authors can opt out of 
OA unconditionally (Condition C2), deposit rates are higher than when 
each individual OA opt-out has to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. 
The effect is especially strong for RA (lower right); for each of the three 
years OA (lower left) and OA+RA (above) also show the same pattern as 
RA (above). 
 
Figure 11: There is no consistent, interpretable effect of conditional vs. 
unconditional OA opt-out (Condition C2) on deposit latencies across the 
years. (Only OA + RA shown here) 
All the data on deposit rates and deposit latencies can be thought of as measures of 
mandate compliance rates. In the case of the effect of allowing unconditional opt-out 
from the OA requirement, the biggest observed increase is in RA deposits, and our 
interpretation is that authors are more likely to comply with a deposit requirement if they 
can choose to deposit as RA rather than OA whenever they feel it is necessary, without 
the prospect of having to do individual case-by-case negotiation for a waiver of the OA 
requirement. Knowing that making the deposit OA is optional makes it more likely that 
an author will comply with the requirement to deposit-on-acceptance – or even to 
deposit at all.  
Power of Updated MELIBEA Score to Predict Deposit Rate 
The original option-values and condition-weightings in the formula for the MELIBEA 
score were initialized largely on the basis of the recommendations of Peter Suber 
(2009) regarding mandate “strength” (including how many of the potential desiderata of 
OA they stipulate, such as Libre OA permissions and Gold OA funding). Based on their 
observed success rate for increasing and accelerating deposits, the initial MELIBEA 
values and weightings for mandate strength can now be updated as empirical evidence 
accrues so as to yield a formula with increased power to predict mandate effectiveness 
rather than just mandate strength. Using the current findings on the association of 
Conditions C2 (Opt-Out), C4 (Deposit Timing) and C7 (Internal Use), we have updated 
option-values and condition-weightings of MELIBEA to reflect their correlations with 
success: Higher values have been assigned to those options that our t-tests and 
ANOVAs showed to be more predictive of deposit rate and latency (Table 3). We have 
accordingly re-weighted the MELIBEA formula so as to reflect mandate effectiveness, 
assigning zero weight to the two irrelevant conditions (C1, Mandate/Request and C8, 
Theses) and equal weights to the rest (Figure 12). 
0(𝐶1) +  1(𝐶2) +  1(𝐶3) +  1(𝐶4) +  1(𝐶5) +  1(𝐶6) +  1(𝐶7) +  0(𝐶8) 
Figure 12: Updated values of the initial weights on the eight conditions 
(C1-C8), and the weights on the value options for each of these 
conditions, in MELIBEA’s formula for mandate strength, as modified for 
predicting mandate effectiveness based on the findings of the present 
study. Condition C1 (Mandate or Request) was dropped because this 
study only considers mandates. Condition C8 (Theses) was dropped 
because this study considers only journal articles. The six other condition 
weights are set as one, so the substantive weighting updates were to the 
option values for each of the six non-zero conditions, as shown in Table 3, 
compared to Table 2. 
 
 
 Table 3: MELIBEA formula (Table 2) with values updated based on the 
findings of the present study. Higher values have been assigned to the 
options that t-tests and ANOVAs showed to be predictive of deposit rate 
and latency. 
We make no claim that the new values and weightings are as yet optimal. A larger 
sample may well bring other conditions and their options into play as more mandates 
are adopted. In addition, latency effects will be clearer with a more complete and 
accurate sample than the present one. Nor are deposit rates and latencies the only 
criterion against which one might wish to validate mandate strength estimators. 
However, it is clear that our evidence-based updates of the initial values and weights 
already do increase the power of the MELIBEA Score to predict deposit rate (though not 
latency). The correlations in Figure 13 are all higher than those in Figure 5, and 
especially dramatically so for RA deposits. 
  
Value 0 12 months after publication
0 Request 0.5 6 months after publication
0 Requirement 0 More  than 12 months after publication
0 Unspecified (‘after period stipulated by the publisher’)
0 No
1 No deposit opt-out but unconditional OA opt-out 0 Require blanket copyright reservation, no opt-out
5 No deposit opt-out but conditional OA opt-out 0.5 Allow opt-out from copyright reservation case by case
0 Deposit opt-out and unconditional OA opt-out 0 Retain copyright and license specific rights to publisher
0.5
Authors retain the non-exclusive rights of explotation to allow 
self-archiving
2.5 Deposit author’s version 1 Authors should retain copyright whenever is possible
0 Deposit publisher’s version 0
Any publishing or copyright agreements concerning articles have  
to comply with the OA policy
0 Unspecified 0 No copyright reservation
0 Unrefereed preprint
5 Yes
0 As soon as possible 0 No
10 At time of acceptance
0 At time of publication 0 Yes
0 Unspecified 0 No
C1: Mandate or Request C5 : Embargo Length
C8 : Theses 
C2 : Opt-out 
C6 : Copyright 
C3 : Version 
C7 :  Internal use 
C4 : Deposit Timing  
  
 
Figure 13: Correlation between updated MELIBEA mandate strength score 
and deposit rate, by publication year, for RA deposits, OA deposits and RA 
+ OA deposits jointly, with values and weights updated to reflect the 
findings of this study. (Cf. Figure 5). (The correlations with latency 
remained inconsistent and uninterpretable.) 
Limitations 
This is an exploratory study in which we made a priori predictions as to which variables 
we expected to have an effect on deposit rates and latency, in which direction, and why. 
As only the three predicted variables had significant effects, we did not apply a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple a posteriori tests (though we did test many other 
potential variables). We take the replication of the direction of the effects (whether 
individually significant or insignificant) -- across the three independent time periods, and 
for RA + OA jointly as well as for RA and OA separately -- to further decrease the 
likelihood that the observed pattern of effects was due to chance.  
(1) The data from multiple databases have limitations because they are incomplete, 
noisy and approximate. We have publication data from the top 12,000 journals, but we 
only have access to the full deposit and publication date of a portion of them. The 
latency data are especially noisy and incomplete. 
(2) The short (3-year) time window for which we have deposit rate and latency data 
provides a narrowing picture of changes across time, especially for the most recent 
year, 2013 (as measured in April 2014). For the articles published earliest in the 3-year 
time window (2011) the deposit rates have stabilized and the latency averages are 
based on a long enough time-base (2.5 years), whereas the deposit rates for articles 
published in the second half of 2013 are based on a time window of less than a year.  
(3) MELIBEA’s classification and weighting of OA mandates concerned mandate 
“strength” rather than mandate effectiveness: its initial option-values and condition-
weights were hence not intended, validated or optimized for predicting effectiveness. 
We have now updated them empirically to predict deposit rate based on the data 
available to date. As the number and age of the mandates increases and the ranking 
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and classification system is updated and optimized further, the data should become less 
noisy and variable and the effectiveness prediction can be further optimized. Moreover, 
if new mandates adopt the conditions that have already emerged as most important 
from the present analysis, both the rate and speed of deposit are likely be enhanced.  
(4) As stated, the analysis is based only on (non-OA) publications indexed by WoS, and 
the criterion for inclusion was at least 30 WoS-indexed publications within the 3-year 
window. It is very possible and likely that all institutions also had non-WoS-indexed 
publications in that interval, but only WOS-indexed articles were used in order to ensure 
that we were comparing like with like. Future studies will look at total publication output, 
but for OA purposes it is fair to say that WoS-indexed publications are the first priority 
test case. In particular, not only are those the publications that most users need most, 
but, even more important, those are the publications that are most likely to be 
embargoed by their publishers, thereby constraining deposit rates and mandate 
effectiveness 
Summary and Conclusions 
Our first finding was that the higher an institution’s MELIBEA score for OA mandate 
strength, the higher was the rate of deposit in its institutional repository for each year, 
but the correlation was small, and was significant only for OA + RA deposits jointly and 
for OA deposits alone, but not for RA deposits alone. There was also no correlation with 
latency.  
In an effort to increase the predictive power of the MELIBEA score for mandate 
effectiveness rather than just strength, and to determine the effects of its conditions 
individually, we analyzed three of the eight conditions separately to test their effects on 
deposit rate and latency. (Two of the other MELIBEA conditions were irrelevant 
because they pertained to non-mandates or to theses, respectively, and for the 
remaining three the sample was too small to test them separately.) The three conditions 
we examined were (C4) when the author had to do the deposit (upon acceptance, upon 
publication, or unspecified; (C7) whether the deposit was required for internal use (such 
as performance evaluation) and (C2) whether the author could opt out of the 
requirement to make the deposit OA unconditionally or only conditionally, on a case-by-
case basis.  
For the deposit-timing condition (C4), the requirement to deposit immediately upon 
acceptance generated significantly higher deposit rates for OA + RA deposits combined. 
The pattern was also the same for OA and RA separately, and for each individual year. 
For deposit latency there was no consistent or significant effect.  
For the internal-use condition (C7), requiring deposit for internal use generated 
significantly higher deposit rates for OA + RA deposits combined. The pattern was also 
the same for RA and OA separately, and for each individual year, but the rate-increase 
was larger for RA than for OA. The internal-use requirement had an effect on deposit 
latency as well: Deposit is done earlier when it is required for internal use (same pattern 
for RA + OA, RA, OA, and for each year), but the latency-shortening effect is stronger 
for OA than for RA.  
Our interpretation for C7 is that when the deposit is required for internal use (which 
mostly means research performance evaluation), more authors who may feel inhibited 
by a publisher OA embargo from depositing OA go ahead and deposit as RA rather 
than not depositing at all or waiting for the end of the publisher OA embargo to deposit. 
This is what increases the rate of RA deposit. For the OA deposits, which tend to be 
done later than RA deposits (because of publisher OA embargoes), the effect of their 
being needed for internal use is to reduce their latency (i.e., speed them up).  
For the opt-out condition (C2), allowing unconditional opt-out from the OA requirement 
(but not the deposit requirement) generated significantly higher deposit rates for OA + 
RA deposits combined. The pattern was the same for RA and OA separately, and for 
each individual year, but the effect was especially marked for RA. (There was no effect 
on latency.) Our interpretation for C2 is that authors are more likely to comply with a 
deposit requirement if they know they can choose unconditionally to deposit as RA 
rather than OA.  
Using our findings on the effects of these three conditions, we updated the initial option-
values and condition-weightings of the original MELIBEA formula with the result that its 
correlation with deposit rate increased overall, and especially for RA deposits. There is 
still no correlation with deposit latency, but as RA deposits eventually become OA 
deposits, increases in RA may reflect earlier deposit of papers that might otherwise only 
have been deposited later, as OA. (Note that RA deposits are indirectly accessible even 
during the OA embargo through individual user requests to authors via the repository’s 
copy-request Button; Sale et al 2014.) 
Our updating of a subset of the MELIBEA values and weights shows that in 
combination, three (at least) of the MELIBEA parameters can already predict deposit 
rate – and hence reflect mandate effectiveness – more closely than the original 
MELIBEA overall score, which was designed to reflect mandate strength. This is just an 
illustration of how further research can be used to keep optimizing the predictive power 
of estimators of mandate effectiveness. 
Practically speaking, it also emerges from this analysis that the deposit-on-acceptance 
requirement, internal-use requirement, and the possibility of unconditionally opting out 
of making the deposit OA are each very important factors in the effectiveness of an OA 
mandate in generating greater author compliance and hence more deposits and more 
OA, sooner. As the rate of adoption of OA policies is now growing too, these findings 
make it possible for OA policy-making to become more evidence-based and more 
effective by taking these findings into account in designing OA mandates.2 
                                                          
2 There are many other factors that might increase deposit rates, with or without 
mandates. Having a CRIS is one of them. Having IRstats that give authors feedback on 
This study was based only on institutional mandates rather than funder mandates, 
because it is far easier to identify total journal article output for an institution’s 
researchers (using the WoS institutional tag) than for a funder’s grantees (which spans 
many institutions), but there is no reason to think the conclusions do not apply to both 
kinds of mandates.  
References 
Archambault, É. (2013). The Tipping Point: Open Access Comes of Age. In ISSI 2013 
Proceedings of 14th International Society of Scientometrics and Informetrics 
Conference (Vol. 1, pp. 1165-1680). http://users.ecs.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Temp/ISSI-
ARchambeault.pdf  
Berners-Lee, T. (1989). Information management: A proposal. 
http://www.w3.org/History/1989/proposal.html  
Björk B.C., Welling, P., Laakso, M., Majlender, P., Hedlund, T., & Guðni, G. (2010). 
Open Access to the scientific journal literature: Situation 2009. PLOS ONE, 5(6), 
e11273. http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0011273   
Björk, B. C., Laakso, M., Welling, P., & Paetau, P. (2014). Anatomy of green open 
access. Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, 65(2), 237-
250. http://openaccesspublishing.org/apc8/Personal%20VersionGreenOa.pdf  
BOAI (2002) Budapest Open Access Initiative. 
http://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org  
Carr, Leslie and Harnad, Stevan (2005) Keystroke Economy: A Study of the Time and 
Effort Involved in Self-Archiving. University of Southampton Working Paper. 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/260688/  
Carr, L., Harnad, S., & Swan, A. (2007). A Longitudinal Study of the Practice of Self-
Archiving. University of Southampton Working Paper. http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/263906/  
Chen, X. (2014). Open Access in 2013: Reaching the 50% Milestone. Serials Review, 
40(1), 21-27. 
Edgington, E., & Onghena, P. (2007). Randomization tests. CRC Press. 
ETH Zurich FAQ (2015) Legal questions on self-archiving in ETH E-Collection  
https://www.library.ethz.ch/en/ms/Open-Access-at-ETH-Zurich/Legal-aspects-of-open-
access-publishing/Legal-questions-on-self-archiving-in-ETH-E-Collection  
Gargouri, Y, Larivière, V & Harnad, S (2013) Ten-year Analysis of University of Minho 
Green OA Self-Archiving Mandate In E Rodrigues, A Swan & AA Baptista, Eds. Uma  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the downloads of their articles is another. Having automatic SWORD-based 
import/export to and from other repositories is another. Providing librarian-facilitated 
proxy deposit is another. 
Década  de Acesso Aberto e na UMinho no Mundo. U Minho 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/358882/  
Gargouri, Y., Larivière, V., Gingras, Y., & Harnad, S. (2012). Green and gold Open 
Access percentages and growth, by discipline. In É. Archambault, Y. Gingras, & V. 
Larivière (Eds.), Proceedings of 17th International Conference on Science and 
Technology Indicators. Montréal, Canada 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/340294/1/stiGargouri.pdfhttp://eprints.soton.ac.uk/340294/1/sti
Gargouri.pdf  
Gargouri, Y., Hajjem, C., Larivière, V., Gingras, Y., Carr, L., Brody, T., & Harnad, S. 
(2010). Self-selected or mandated, open access increases citation impact for higher 
quality research. PloS one, 5(10). http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0013636  
Harnad, S. (2006) Opening Access by Overcoming Zeno's Paralysis, in Jacobs, N., Eds. 
Open Access: Key Strategic, Technical and Economic Aspects. Chandos. 
http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12094/  
Harnad, S., Brody, T., Vallieres, F., Carr, L., Hitchcock, S., Gingras, Y, Oppenheim, C., 
Stamerjohanns, H., & Hilf, E. (2004) The green and the gold roads to Open Access. 
Nature Web Focus. http://www.nature.com/nature/focus/accessdebate/21.html    
Harvard University Library (2012) Major Periodical Subscriptions Cannot Be Sustained. 
Faculty Advisory Council Memorandum on Journal Pricing 
http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k77982&tabgroupid=icb.tabgroup143448  
Hitchcock, S. (2013) The effect of open access and downloads ('hits') on citation impact: 
a bibliography of studies. http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html 
http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html  
Khabsa, M., & Giles, C. L. (2014). The Number of Scholarly Documents on the Public 
Web. PloS ONE, 9(5), e93949. 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0093949%22%20%5Cl%20
%22pone-0093949-g003  
MELIBEA (2015) Directory and estimator policies for open access to scientific 
production. http://www.accesoabierto.net/politicas http://www.accesoabierto.net/politicas  
 
Miller, FP, Vandome, AF, McBrewster J (2010) Serials Crisis. VDM Publishing 
Okerson, A., & O'Donnell, J. J. (Eds.). (1995). Scholarly journals at the crossroads: a 
subversive proposal for electronic publishing. Association of Research Libraries. 
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/003013520  
Pinfield, S. (2001). How do physicists use an e-print archive? Implications for 
institutional e-print services. D-Lib Magazine, 7(12) http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51/  
Rentier, B., & Thirion, P. (2011). The Liège ORBi model: Mandatory policy without rights 
retention but linked to assessment processes. Berlin 9 Prconference Workshop, 
November 2011, http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/jspui/bitstream/2268/102031/1/Rentier-WashDC-
2011.pdf  
ROAR (2015) Registry of Open Access Repositories. 
http://roar.eprints.org/information.html 
 
ROARMAP (2015) Registry of Open Access Repositories Mandatory Archiving Policies. 
http://roarmap.eprints.org/ 
 
Sale, A., Couture, M., Rodrigues, E., Carr, L. and Harnad, S. (2014) Open Access 
Mandates and the "Fair Dealing" Button. In: Dynamic Fair Dealing: Creating Canadian 
Culture Online (Rosemary J. Coombe & Darren Wershler, Eds.) 
http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/18511/   
 
Self-Archiving FAQ (2015) http://www.eprints.org/openaccess/self-faq/  
 
SHERPA/Romeo (2015) Publisher copyright policies & self-archiving. 
http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/   
 
Spezi, V., Fry, J., Creaser, C., Probets, S., & White, S. (2013). Researchers' green open 
access practice: a cross-disciplinary analysis. Journal of Documentation, 69(3), 334-
359. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-
jspui/bitstream/2134/12324/3/Green_OA_practice_and_Disciplinary_differences_revise
d_version_for%20repository.pdf 
 
Suber, P. (2009) Open access policy options for funding agencies and universities. 
SPARC Open Access Newsletter 130 February 2009 
http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/newsletter/02-02-09.htm  
Suber, P. (2008a) Gratis and Libre Open Access. SPARC Open Access Newsletter 124 
August 2008 http://www.sparc.arl.org/resource/gratis-and-libre-open-access  
 
Suber, P. (2008b) An open access mandate for the NIH. SPARC Open Access 
Newsletter 117, January 2008. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4322583  
 
Swan, A. (2014) HEFCE announces Open Access policy for the next REF in the UK. 
LSE Impact of Social Sciences blog, 1 April 2014 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2014/04/01/hefce-open-access-ref-
gamechanger/  
 
Swan, A., Gargouri, Y., Hunt, M & Harnad, S (2015) Open Access Policy: Numbers, 
Analysis, Effectiveness. Pasteur4OA Workpackage 3 Report. 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/375854/ 
Swan, A., & Brown, S. (2005) Open access self-archiving: An author study. JISC 
Report. 
Taylor & Francis (2014) Open Access Survey: examining the changing views of Taylor 
& Francis authors http://www.tandfonline.com/page/openaccess/opensurvey/2014 
 
Thomson-Reuters/ISI Web of Science. (2015). http://wokinfo.com  
 
Wallace, J. M. (2011). PEER: green open access–insight and evidence. Learned 
Publishing, 24(4), 267-277. 
http://www.peerproject.eu/fileadmin/media/ppt_about_peer/JWallace_LearnedPubl_Oct
2011.pdf 
 
Webometrics (2015). Ranking web of universities. 
http://www.webometrics.info/en/Methodology  
 
Xia, J., Gilchrist, S. B., Smith, N. X., Kingery, J. A., Radecki, J. R., Wilhelm, M. 
L., ... & Mahn, A. J. (2012). A review of open access self-archiving mandate 
policies. portal: Libraries and the Academy, 12(1), 85-102. 
http://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/portal_libraries_and_the_academy/portal_pre_
print/archive/articles/12.1xia.pdf  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
